Controversial appointments in regulatory bodies increase workload of CIAA and the Supreme Court
What happens, if a referee sides with one team in a football match or referee starts scoring goals oneself or a referee allows one team or a particular player to score goal with hand, or allows make illegal tackle?
Disaster!
In such a case, not only the referee is banned but the game of football is also banned, and the whole stadium comes down infuriated, and protest the rigging. In few football-crazy nations, referees and players have even been attacked on the field by the fans.
And that’s what happening in Nepal’s economy. Even worse, in Nepal many a times, referee and player become the same person.
A free market and a football game may seem worlds apart but both operate on the same basis of competition, rules, and performance.
In a football game, two teams compete against each other to score goals and win the match. Similarly, in a free market, various companies compete to offer better goods and services to attract consumers and generate profit. The objective, in both systems, is to outperform rivals – by scoring more goals in football or by winning over more customers in market – but both play by rules, and books.
In a market economy, the players are private sector, and the referee is the regulatory body. For the economy to operate, the regulator must be independent, impartial, competent, and uphold high ethical standards, just like a fair football referee.
If the regulator is free, impartial with high moral – apart from having the required qualification – it can guide the market through free and fair competitive practice, otherwise, it will be a disaster.
Like the referee is solely responsible to make the game disciplined, fair and competitive, the regulator is responsible to make the market disciplined, free, fair and competitive.
Thus, both systems rely on rules and referees. In football, the game is governed by clear rules enforced by referees, ensuring fair play and penalizing fouls.
Similarly, in a market economy, laws and regulatory institutions play a similar role – ensuring fair competition, enforcing contracts, and preventing malpractices like fraud or monopolies, or conflict of interest.
Just as bad refereeing ruins a football match, poor regulation destroys markets. If regulators don’t play their role or start bending the rules or flexing muscle, the market system collapses. That’s precisely what is happening in Nepal.
When regulators shirk their responsibilities or manipulate rules, short-term gains may go to interest groups like the 'Thermal Gun Gang', but the entire economy has to bear the cost, in the long-term.
Thus, Nepal’s current economic issues didn’t arise overnight. Vested interest groups, empowered by political parties and their leaders, have been manipulating the rules, cheating the system, and sidelining genuine players, leading to the present crisis. It’s a systemic problem – a result of deep-rooted collusion between vested interested groups, rent-seekers, and political actors.
Just like referees in football don’t control how players move or pass, market regulators also don’t direct how businesses operate neither do they take part in the competition; they simply ensure the rules are followed or not.
But in Nepal, referee dictate the player how to play, and in some cases, also move the goal post or manipulate the size of the goal post, and change the rule of the game after the players enter the play-ground. That too, in the order of vested interested groups like ‘Thermal Gun Gang’.
The concept of a market system is being distorted into a free-for-all in Nepal as these vested groups (mis)use regulatory institutions to instruct businesses on how to operate – instead of ensuring free, fair and competitive environment – and protect their own vested interests. Like a referee telling players how to play football, the economy is now under stress due to such regulatory interference.
As a result, in Nepal, not only entrepreneurs but also ordinary people, who follow rules, are increasingly seen as fools. The narrative being set – of course by vested interests, political parties, and even the bureaucracy – is that ‘breaking rules’ is smartness and obeying the law and order is stupidity.
In a society, where flouting laws is celebrated and thought heroic, democracy, freedom of expression, and entrepreneurship become a joke. Cheaters become leaders; and honest ones die hungry.
However, there is an important difference between football game and market too. A football game usually has one winner and the other loser, after a fixed time period, making it a zero-sum contest. In contrast, the market allows all to win – a business can succeed by creating value, and consumers also benefit from getting better quality products and services in cheaper price, and the government also benefits as it gets more revenue.
Nepali market has also seen and experienced such benefits, be it in the case of telecom sector or aviation services. After the entry of Ncell in the market, Nepal Telcom’s service and quality improved and prices came down making it accessible to more people. Both the players, Ncell and Nepal Telecom, generated good profit, consumers got cheaper and better-quality service, and the government also received more revenue.
Similarly, after the autonomy of the Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB), the banks and financial institutions (BFIs) have been encouraged to play fair and competitive. Despite being autonomous and the most successful and professional regulator in Nepal, Nepal Rastra Bank is, also sometimes mired into controversies, let alone other regulators like Securities Board Nepal (SEBON), Nepal Insurance Authority (NIA), Nepal Telecommunications Authority (NTA) and Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN), which are neither autonomous nor able to reflect any professional and impartial character.
Even worse lately, the appointments in these regulators have been controversial due to political interference, lack of transparency in selection process and compromise in accountability mechanisms.
Moreover, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) is flooded with complaints – with proofs – and the Supreme Court is busy with such cases claiming that the appointments are rigged.
CIAA is currently investigating into a complaint alleging that the work experience documents submitted by the chairman of the Nepal Telecommunications Authority (NTA) Bhupendra Bhandari are fake. The complaint, filed by a civil society group working on good governance, claims that the documents Bhandari submitted during his appointment process are forged. The group submitted the complaint to the CIAA along with the related documents.
Similarly, the CIAA has also started the investigation into the work experience documents submitted by the chairman of Nepal Insurance Authority (NIA) Sarad Ojha. Ojha’s alleged fake work experience documents’ case is also under consideration of Supreme Court. After the CIAA probe, the Finance Ministry is also trying to relieve him or suspend him to escape the CIAA further probe.
Nepal Insurance Authority, as a regulator, lost credibility among stakeholders, especially at a time when the insurance sector is under pressure to merge, digitize, and follow stricter compliance rules, and to build confidence of the sector that has immense scope for growth.
The appointment of NIA chairman Ojha allegedly bypassed the standard open competition and recommendation procedure outlined in law (as per the Insurance Act and public official selection norms), apart from the alleged forged work experience documents. The forgery of government documents is a serious offence. “Government document forgery is a criminal offence that attract cash and jail term both,” according to advocate Jagdish Dahal.
And the Finance Ministry’s delay in taking action against such serious allegation is strengthening the voices of critics, who claim the appointment was politically motivated and intended to bring someone pliable to the chair, particularly as the Nepal Insurance Authority was overseeing major issues like disputes over reinsurance monopoly, insurance mergers and policy reforms.
The Insurance Act (2079 BS) mandates at least five years of high-level managerial experience in related sector and a minimum age of 35 years. Critics claim Ojha did not meet these criteria, as he was only 33 at the time of appointment, and worked part-time as an insurance agent and college lecturer, not as a senior manager.
Likewise, a complaint filed with the CIAA alleges Ojha submitted fabricated work-experience certificates, including managerial roles at a media house to meet eligibility. A Supreme Court writ petition mirrored these claims, urging annulment of the appointment based on deceitful documentation.
After his appointment, Ojha, in April 2025, modified a directive concerning foreign employment insurance pools delaying equitable fund distribution by one year, reversing a decision by his predecessor Surya Prasad Silwal. The parliamentarians from CPN (Maoist Centre) called for a parliamentary investigation into his appointment and amendments, accusing the government of abusing its authority.
However, the Supreme Court issued show-cause notices on Ojha’s appointment, but no final verdict or restraint has been issued yet. The Court is examining the legal validity of documentation and the cabinet’s authority in superseding statutory criteria, which signals signs of deeper governance failures in appointment of regulatory institutions.
Likewise, the controversies in appointments in regulatory institutions do not stop here. The CAAN and SEBON chairmen’s controversies have become regular headlines eroding institutional credibility, increased investor and public distrust, and suggesting the institutional capture by the vested interested groups, also called middlemen by public, like ‘Thermal Gun Gang’.
The accusation that certain vested interested groups like ‘Thermal Gun Gang’ and political actors wanted to weaken the regulatory authority so they could operate with less scrutiny – especially amid rising complaints about irregularities in actions by the regulators in the financial sector.
Thus, Ojha’s appointment, like other recent regulator placements, is viewed as politically motivated and aimed at installing loyalists, circumventing meritocracy, which fits a broader pattern: appointments in SEBON and NTA.
Similarly, the SEBON chairman Santosh Narayan Shrestha’s act of approving Initial Public Offering (IPO) of companies with dubious fundamentals and no clear ownership like Trade Tower Ltd, and asking commission to approve the IPOs of hydropower companies in pipeline, is the case of capital market distortions and exploitation of largely unsupervised capital markets.
Apart from that fast-tracking the IPO approval of Bungal hydropower, a company with Shrestha’s personal investment, is a clear case of conflict of interest, and a case study – for Nepal’s intelligentsia – where the referee and player is the same person.
Thus, the Finance Committee under the Parliament, on Thursday, sought explanation on approval of Bungal Hydro, and also Shrestha’s suspicious determination to award license to the second stock exchange without reforming the Nepal Stock Exchange (Nepse).
Though Shrestha tried to explain in Finance Committee on Thursday that he did not ask for commission to approve the IPO, but the Independent Power Producers Association of Nepal (IPPAN), institutionally and individual energy entrepreneurs have been accusing him of sending his henchmen to bargain for commission for IPO approval.
Moreover, another complaint against the SEBON chair Shrestha is also registered at the Parliamentary Accounts Committee (PAC) and CIAA.
However, the appointment controversy at the regulatory institutions is emblematic of a larger systemic issue, and it’s not overnight.
Inexperienced, politically aligned appointees undermine regulatory bodies’ technical competence and independence, which in the long run, erode business confidence, and pull the country down towards degrowth.
Both the market and football thrive on competition, skill, rules, and accountability, and of course the referee’s or the regulator’s operation. While one plays out on the field and the other in the economy, both reflect the importance of fair play, innovation, and strategic thinking in achieving success.
Thus, the nexus between vested interested groups – often operating as middlemen or power brokers like ‘Thermal Gun Gang’ – and politicians in Nepal has had a corrosive effect on regulatory institutions, weakening the rule of law, distorting economic incentives, and undermining business confidence.
The crowding out of genuine entrepreneurs – new or non-aligned businesses – who will always remain struggling to compete with cronies getting favourable rules and inside information, distorting the market, will lead to the market failure, and economic collapse.
That’s why vested interested groups-political networks lobby against laws that threaten their rent-seeking positions like competition law, digital payments regulation, anti-money laundering measures, and conflict of interest.
They try to block independent oversight, audit, or regulatory modernization, which will distract legitimate investors including foreign direct investment (FDI) as it will be too risky and unpredictable business environment to invest in Nepal. And such worse condition promotes outmigration of capital and talent.
The capture of regulatory institutions by a nexus of vested interested groups like ‘Thermal Gun Gang’ and politicians create a toxic ecosystem in economy that breeds corruption, inefficiency, and distrust, eroding the foundations of the economy.
Thus, restoring business confidence in Nepal requires independent regulatory bodies, strong conflict-of-interest laws, transparent procurement and IPO processes, depoliticization of the bureaucracy, and active civil society and investigative journalism. Unless systemic reform breaks this alliance, Nepali economy risks prolonged stagnation and a deeper legitimacy crisis.
(Published at Nepalkhabar on July 14 -- https://en.nepalkhabar.com/news/detail/14612/)
